Category Archives: War preparation

7. The Defence of the Nation: Junior and Senior Cadets

In 1911 Australia introduced a universal military training scheme that covered all males from twelve to twenty-six years of age. The scheme was something of a first in the English-speaking world. The plan was that over a time frame of roughly 10 years the scheme would generate sufficient numbers to create a viable Australian Military Forces.

The universal training scheme was broadly supported by all key political parties, including the ALP. As well, Field Marshal Viscount Kitchener had undertaken a study on the Defence of Australia in 1910 and this report supported the introduction of the scheme.

Under the scheme, all male children from the age of twelve to fourteen were required to train as Junior Cadets, all male youth from fourteen to eighteen were to train as Senior Cadets and, from eighteen to twenty-six, all males were to train in the Citizen Forces. In short, from twelve to twenty-six years of age, all males in Australia were to be required by law to undertake an extended and cumulative military training program.

Kitchener’s thinking on the need to raise such a National Citizen Force for Australia’s defence went to the heart of how threatened Australia saw itself and how its defence policy was crafted round this fear of invasion:

1. It is an axiom held by the British Government that the Empire’s existence depends primarily upon the maintenance of adequate and efficient naval forces. As long as this condition is fulfilled, and as long as British superiority is assured, then it is an accepted principle that no British dominion can be successfully and permanently occupied by an organised invasion from overseas.
2. But in applying this principle to Australasia, considerations of time and space cannot be disregarded. The conduct of a great war depends upon the calculated and proper combination of naval, military, and diplomatic forces; and it is quite conceivable that in the future, as in the past, national considerations may require the concentration of British naval forces in one or other theatre of operations. It follows that in seas remote from such a concentration, the British Naval Force may find themselves for the moment inferior in force to an actual, or potential, enemy. In such a situation, although our ultimate superiority at sea might not be a matter of doubt, some time might elapse before our command of the sea was definitely secured in all waters. It, therefore, becomes the duty of all self-governing Dominions to provide a military force adequate, not only to deal promptly with any attempt at invasion, but also to ensure local safety and public confidence until our superiority at sea has been decisively and comprehensively asserted. (Kitchener 1910, p.5)

He then calculated that, in Australia’s case, such a force needed to be 80,000 fighting troops.

In short, the Australian Military Forces to be raised by this scheme of universal training were to be for the defence of Australia, in Australia.

Interestingly, at that time, most similar nations were not in favour of such citizen-soldier type armies and opted instead for the permanent, professional and volunteer standing or regular army. The other striking feature of the Australian scheme was the focus on youth, and even childhood. This was definitely unique. In fact, the Swiss model, the closest scheme to the one implemented in Australia in 1911, and the one with which Australia was most impressed, did not cover males until they reached eighteen years of age.

There were many other reasons why the Australian Military Forces were to be raised via a scheme which had such a focus on youth. For a start, the establishment of cadet forces had had a long history in Australia, as in Britain, and the idea of youth being inculcated with military discipline and the camaraderie of military life and service was popular. However, as popular as the cadets were in some schools – both private and state – Barrett (1979, p. 32) gives figures that make it clear that voluntarism was not going to produce the numbers that were required. In 1910, for Australia as a whole, voluntarism had involved 10,500 senior and mounted cadets, and 24,000 junior cadets. But in 1913, two years after the introduction of the compulsory scheme, the equivalent figures were 130,000 senior cadets and 50,000 junior cadets.

It was also certainly the case that many politicians, educationists and ‘child savers’ believed compulsory military training for youth would not only meet military ends but also help to combat some of the evils associated with the rapid process of urbanisation from the late nineteenth century, from poor health and lack of physical fitness through to weak moral development and larrikinism. Military style disciple and military training would toughen youth. There was also the view that youth had to be taught both the worth of citizenship and the responsibilities associated with it. Lessons like these learnt as a young person, would shape the adult’s commitment to the democratic idealism underpinning the new Commonwealth. There was also the lesson of egalitarianism, whereby the compulsion of all males meant that there were no exceptions on the grounds of such as class, wealth or religion. Just as secular, state schooling was forming the new citizen in an egalitarian society, and breaking down the rigid class hierarchy of the old world, so too would compulsory military training strengthen the principles of egalitarianism and meritocracy. Mirroring the idea that democracy and civic compulsion could co-exist  was the complementary relationship between universal military training and compulsory schooling. Typically, at the time, schooling was compulsory through to fourteen and therefore by having all male students from the age of twelve involved in the scheme there was an overlap between compulsion to attend school and compulsion to undertake military training. The latter was but an extension of the former.

There was also the widely held perception that the Australian was a natural soldier. From the Boer War on, the skills and character of the Australian soldier – most typically the light horse trooper – had been extolled. British experts fostered the claim. For example, Kitchener, in the 1910 report cited earlier, referred to the …natural military aptitude of the Australian (p.6). He noted, The Australian citizen-soldier experiences much of military value in the every-day conditions of his civil life. He is generally a good rider, active, lithe and intelligent (p.15). The belief in the citizen-soldier and commitment to the universal training scheme flowed naturally from the perception that all Australians, by their very person and ordinary life experiences, were able to be transformed, easily, into first-rate soldiers.

Over time, opposition to the scheme grew. There were definitely cases where youth rejected the scheme on the grounds of religious belief and/or conscientious objection; and those who did were charged under the Defence Act and ended up in military detention, with some even in solitary confinement. However, the more common opposition was expressed in the more mundane manner of non-compliance or passive resistance: youth did not register in the first place or failed to attend the compulsory training sessions. Many young men found the scheme very demanding and avoided participating whenever they could. There was not really an issue with the junior cadets because this first stage of the universal training (12-14 years of age) was carried out in school, and was generally treated as just another piece of curriculum and school work: essentially physical development and training. Also, if the boy stayed on at school past fourteen and continued to complete his senior cadet training within the school context then this was also manageable. However, if the youth had left school and had started work and, simultaneously, was trying to adjust to his new independence, as well as manage the usual range of sport, social and family commitments then the training regime could pose serious difficulties. For senior cadets (14-18) the annual requirements were very significant – four whole-day drills, twelve half-day drills, and twenty-four night drills – with always the possibility of extra sessions: to make sure standards were met, to make up for sessions missed or to undertake ‘voluntary’ sessions. Plus there was also the time to get to and from the training centre and the effort taken over the uniform. Effectively, the training requirements, particularly for those who were not enthusiastic, were onerous. They also stretched out for a very long period in a young person’s life.

From as early as 1912, registrations in the scheme were less than they should have been. Barrett (1979, p.131) refers to a claimed figure of non-registration as high as 34%. Prosecutions were initiated and numbers picked up, but it was clear that there was non-compliance and many youth and their parents were inclined to dodge their responsibilities.

Cases where youth failed in their duty – shirkers – were reported in the press, with the obvious intention to hammer home the consequences of non-compliance. It became more of an issue once the War commenced. For example in The Argus 22 December 1914 – four months after the outbreak – under the headline, Drill Shirkers Sent to Fort the following appeared:

Fifty youths attached to the senior cadet branch of the citizen forces squeezed their way into the Richmond Court out of the drizzling rain yesterday morning. They marched before the bench in relays to answer charges of not having given the personal service required of them by the Defence Act.

Mr. S. J. Goldsmith, P.M. (chairman) deprecated the lack of patriotic spirit, and urged the boys to obey the call to attend military training. If Australia were good enough to live in it was good enough to learn to defend it, and, for his part, he was determined that youths eligible as trainees should realise it. He would give those boys charged with offences against the Defence Act before the war broke out an opportunity to redeem themselves; but as for those who had failed to attend drills since he would listen to no appeal – straight to a fortress they would go.

The magistrate then ordered 12 of them … into the custody of the officers commanding the coast defences at Queenscliff for seven days. He adjourned the other cases but directed those involved to … perform their missing drills forthwith.

Remarkably, for all the compulsion that applied, and the significant penalties associated with non-compliance, the cadet scheme itself was not genuinely universal. The legislation certainly inferred universality and all the political rhetoric emphasised universal obligation and responsibility, but the reality was that universal military training was limited to the capital cities, regional centres and large country towns. Section 138 of the Defence Act of 1909 provided for an area to be proclaimed as exempt from the training. The costs and other practical difficulties of setting up the scheme across all country towns and settlements were too great. Barrett (1979, p.70) noted that in 1911 of some 155,000 boys who registered for the scheme only 59% were ultimately liable for training. He further observed that the population density required to warrant the application of the scheme in sparsely populated rural areas was 2,000 people within a radius of 5 miles. At the time, Yarram’s population was half this number and all the other towns and settlements in the Shire of Alberton were considerably smaller. Thus the Shire was an exempt area, whereas in the larger towns of Gippsland – for example Sale and Warragul – there were senior cadets and all the provisions of the legislation applied.

Exemption meant that, in the Shire, those youth who were keen to pursue military training tended to gravitate to the rifle clubs. Thus when the first wave of recruiting took place in September 1914, youth from the rifle clubs were well represented, particularly those from Stacey’s Bridge Rifle Club. It is also worth noting that as the War progressed, local youth and young men from the Shire would often record on their enlistment papers that they had been residing in an ‘exempt area’, whereas men who were working in the Shire at the time of enlistment but who had lived elsewhere prior to moving there would often give details of their cadet experience, if it had applied.

There was a distinction between the junior and senior cadets in terms of exemption. As indicated, the junior cadets (12-14) came under the control of the Education Department and therefore, wherever there was a school the prescribed training was delivered by the teacher. Essentially, because the training was part of the curriculum exemption was not an issue. At the same time, there were, potentially, variations in its application in terms of the size of the school. There was an expectation that the program would run in all schools but, strictly speaking, it was not compulsory in schools where there were only female teachers. Stockings (2008, p.29) points out that many female teachers, across the nation, actually undertook the training to become certified as junior cadet instructors, at least until they were prevented from doing so. In the smaller schools, particularly one-teacher schools, it was not uncommon for both boys and girls to receive the training. The training itself was a set number of hours of physical training and drill every week, but depending on the school’s size, location and resources it could also cover specialisations such as miniature rifle shooting, swimming, organised games and first aid. Stockings (p. 30) argues that the scheme was essentially a popular one: There is little doubt that for boys, educators and even many military figures, the Junior Cadet system was the most popular part of the overall scheme of universal military training. It appears that this popularity was ultimately its weakness because the Commonwealth tried repeatedly to have the States pick up full financial responsibility; and when this was not successful, support was phased out. By the early 1920s the compulsory nature of the junior cadets was dropped.

In terms of the Shire of Alberton and the junior cadets school size was a critical issue. At the time, there was only one school in the entire Shire – Yarram State School – with more than 100 students. As future posts will show, the junior cadets were indeed active in the school, under A E Paige, Head Master. In fact, as the War progressed there was a strong martial tone to the school. In the next category of state schools – over 50 students – there was again only one school, Alberton. Most of the schools in the Shire were in either the category with over 20 pupils – for example, Alberton West, Binginwarri, Carrajung, Devon North, Gormandale, Hiawatha, etc – or the one with under 20 pupils, for example: Blackwarry, Carrajung South, Darriman etc. In such small schools it was inevitable that the type of program and the zeal with which it was pursued relied on the ingenuity and commitment of the teacher. It is possible that for the children the activities looked more like fitness and games than training and drill. However, as small as the schools were, the junior cadets were visible and, when the War came, they were very much part of the local community’s effort. The following account from the Gippsland Standard and Alberton Shire Representative is of a patriotic concert held in Yarram at the end of September 1914. In the concert, the junior cadets from the Devon North SS feature:

At seven o’clock the “assembly” was sounded on the bugle in the vicinity of the shire hall, where the Town Band, ladies of the Red Cross Society, the North Devon school boys as cadets, the Rifle Club, and the Fire Brigade with torches fell in. The procession proceeded along Commercial Street led by a small boy on a small chestnut pony, to the hall. Here a halt was called, and the order changed. The pony, almost obscured by a large Union Jack, was ridden by the boy as Light Horse up the centre of the hall – to the surprise and delight of the audience – followed by the Red Cross led by a drummer, the North Devon school boys, the Rifle Club, Fire Brigade, and the Town band in the rear. The crowd cheered. … As the last strains of band music died away the stage curtain rose, and there was displayed a very pretty and effective tableau, “Britannia.” Flags predominated. At the rear of the stage hung the mammoth Union Jack, supplied by the Agricultural Society, while flags of Australia, Belgium, France and Russia combined to make a pleasing spectacle. The centre figure was Britannia, faithfully represented by Miss M Bodman, supported by the rifle club and boy cadets. To the right stood “John Bull,” typically portrayed by Mr. Sutton Jones, who sang “Rule Britannia,” chorused by the audience.

The picture of the junior cadets of Devon North SS protecting Britannia in all her might and glory is a striking and noble metaphor for an Imperial war. But ironically, and keeping in mind the real limitations of the Yarram Rifle Club, it is also an apt metaphor for how unprepared Australia was for such an Imperial war. The brief four-year experiment with its cadet-based army had not been the answer. When war broke out in 1914 and Australia looked to defend not just itself but the Empire as a whole, it found it had just an under strength boy-adolescent-youth army, committed by the Defence Act to the defence of Australia only. As Bean (1921, p.34) put it … as Australia could not send away an army of boys, however willing, it was decided to raise a separate army specifically for this service. Hence the Australian Imperial Force.

At the same time, when war came, Australia, more than any other member of the Empire and more than any other English-speaking nation, had laboured hard to teach its male youth the responsibilities of military duty and the rudimentary skills and practices of military life.

Note
It appears that Sutton Llewellyn Jones who played John Bull in the concert was a 24 year-old English immigrant. He had been born in Cheshire in 1899 and in 1914 was working in Yarram as a clerk. There is a record of him failing his enlistment medical on 16 September 1914, and it seems he failed again, this time in Melbourne, in November 1915. However, his brother, who was trying to find him after the War, was convinced that he did enlist. There is no AIF record, but he might have changed his name if, in fact, he did keep trying to enlist.

 

References

Kitchener, Field Marshal Viscount 1910, Defence of Australia: Memorandum, The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia

Barrett, J 1979, Falling In: Australians And ‘Boy Conscription’ 1911-1915, Hale & Iremonger, Sydney

Tanner, TW 1980, Compulsory Citizen Soldiers, Alternative Publishing Co-Operative Limited, Waterloo NSW

Stockings, C 2008, ‘Khaki in the classroom’, History of Education Review, vol. 37, no. 1 pp.16-33

Bean, CEW 1941, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918, Volume 1 – The Story of ANZAC from the outbreak of war to the end of the first phase of the Gallipoli Campaign, May 4, 1915, 11th Edition.

The Argus
‘Drill Shirkers Sent to Fort’ 22 December 1914, p.7

Gippsland Standard and Alberton Shire Representative
‘Patriotic Concert… ‘ 2 October 1914, p.3

Note: details of school sizes in the Shire of Alberton in WW1 are taken from,
Victoria. Education Department 1921, The Education Department’s Record Of War Service 1914-1919

6. The Defence of the Nation: The Rifle Clubs of Alberton Shire

In his general history of the Shire, Adams (1999, pp. 174-176) writes about the setting up of various militia units in the district from the 1880s. These citizen-soldier type arrangements commonly involved the local men supplying their own rifles, horses and even uniforms. Someone with a commission would provide the leadership and organise the training. In the case of Yarram this was Captain  T E Pickett. These local units reached a peak in the Boer War (1899-1902) and while only a relatively small number of locals served in South Africa, there were claims that up to 300 locals were prepared at that time to volunteer to form some kind of local militia unit. The offer was turned down by the Defence authorities.

There was a martial spirit abroad in the colonies, and the most commonly formed group, in both metropolitan and rural districts, was the rifle club in which men could come together for drill and rifle practice (musketry). By 1901 in the Shire of Alberton, there were rifle ranges to support such clubs at Tarraville, Yarram, Balloong, Devon and Carrajung.

Overall, even before Federation, the idea that national defence was tied to locally-formed militia units was well established. Equally, the practice of local men coming together for military drill and weapon training in rifle clubs was seen as a practical demonstration  and test of citizenship and patriotism.

Against this background it was hardly surprising that defence policy in Australia immediately following Federation in 1901became fixed on the idea of ‘citizen soldiery’ with its commitment to form militia drawn from the common citizenry. In addition to the experiences from the 1880s, historians tend to give three general reasons for the focus on the militia: paradoxically, the success of the Boer ‘irregulars’ against the British Army; the commitment to democratic idealism in the new Commonwealth; and ongoing perceptions about both the threat of invasion and the military strategy to counter any such invasion.

In South Africa, the success of the Boers demonstrated the value of lightly-armed, highly-mobile and locally-formed fighting units against more conventional military forces, at least in the short term. Moreover, not only did the Boers demonstrate the strength of this type of ‘guerrilla’ fighting against the British regular forces, but the troops despatched from the various Australian colonies to support the Empire ably demonstrated their skills in matching this kind of warfare. The perception was that the ‘bushman’ of Australia was perfectly suited to this type of warfare. In other words, the raw ingredients for any national defence force were already there, particularly in the rural communities of the new Federation.

Post Federation, there was agreement across the main political groupings, including the Labor Party, that all citizens owed collective and individual responsibility for its defence. A militia-based defence force that covered everyone – or at least all males – would represent proof of this commitment and underline the truly democratic nature of the new Nation. Serving in the militia for the defence of the country was proof of citizenship.

Lastly, while the Royal Navy – supported over time by the emerging Royal Australian Navy – remained the ultimate defence of the Nation, there was the chance that it might not be able, immediately, to thwart any invasion of the Australian mainland. The coastline was extensive, the land mass vast and the population small. In the scenario where the Royal Navy was not immediately able to provide the protection, what was required was the ability to call up, as quickly as possible, a well-trained militia force drawn from across the entire Nation and all classes of citizenry.

For all such reasons, the Defence Act (No. 20 of 1903)  provided for the establishment of Citizens Forces (Section 30) as one of the two key branches of the Defence Forces; and the Militia Forces represented the key component within the Citizens Forces. Similarly, Section 59 of the same Act made it clear that service in the Militia in time of war was required of all males: All male inhabitants of Australia… who have resided therein for six months and are British subjects and are between the ages of eighteen and sixty years shall, in time of war, be liable to serve in the Militia Forces. The call up when it came was to start with All men of the age of eighteen years and upawards, but under thirty years, who are unmarried, or widowers without children. Section 60 (3)

The 1903 legislation made it clear that ‘defence’ in this context was seen in terms of the protection of the territory of the Commonwealth. It was legislation for raising an army against invasion, not for raising an army to fight overseas in an Imperial war. As would become most apparent in 1914, such a war would require volunteers. Section 49 of the 1903 Act stated:

Members of the Defence Force who are members of the Military Forces shall not be required, unless they voluntarily agree to do so, to serve beyond the limits of the Commonwealth and those of any territory under the authority of the Commonwealth.

Importantly, the 1903 Act did not cover the technicalities of setting up the Militia Forces. It was more concerned  to set down guiding principles and intentions, particularly the ideal of universal service, and setting the broad framework for future defence strategy. Similarly, the 1903 Act sketched out the Cadets proposal for male youth between twelve and nineteen to undertake military training (Part V. – Cadets). But, again, the specifics of this scheme covering universal military training for youth were not legislated for until 1909-1910.

One aspect of military preparedness that was covered in the 1903 Act was the formation of Rifle Clubs. Such associations were considered to be a part of the Reserve Forces which, like the Militia Forces, made up the Citizen Forces. So long as members of properly constituted rifle clubs had taken the following oath – or equivalent affirmation – as set down in the Second Schedule of the 1903 Act, they were deemed to be reservists:

I swear that I will well and truly serve Our Sovereign Lord the King as a member of the Reserve Forces of the Commonwealth of Australia, and that I will resist His Majesty’s enemies and cause His Majesty’s peace to be kept and maintained and that I will in all matters appertaining to my service faithfully discharge my duty according to law. So help me God.

The appeal of the rifle club was evident. It supported the notion of the citizen-soldier; and it was committed to the doctrine of military preparedness through ongoing training. Moreover, as had been demonstrated even before Federation, the rifle club could be formed pretty well anywhere, even in rural locations with limited population.

Specifically in term of the Shire of Alberton, Adams (1999, p. 176) identified the following new rifle clubs in the period after 1903: Gormandale (1906), Gunyah Gunyah (1907), Gelliondale (1908), Stacey’s Bridge (1909), Woodside (1911) and Port Albert (1914). Also, the local paper reported the opening of a new club at Hiawatha in May 1914, with a rifle range that met all Defence Department regulations – and the Yarram Rifle Club continued to operate over the same period. Rifle clubs were well established across the Shire.

It seemed to be a boom period for rifle clubs. Senator Millen – Minister for Defence in the Cook Government – was reported in The Argus, 13 July 1914, championing the worth of rifle clubs on a national basis. The report noted that Senator Millen

… had come to the conclusion that, in the present developmental stage of the army, should a crisis arise, the value of riflemen would stand revealed as being greatly in excess of the facilities at present provided for them. (Cheers.) These clubs, as General Sir Ian Hamilton had pointed out, constituted the only available reserve for the militia force. The same high authority had stressed the fact the present defence scheme contained no provision for any other reserve, and that even in 1920 when the scheme reached its maturity, there would be a shortage of men should the army be called upon to take the field. This shortage would have to be made up by the rifle clubs and he had no doubt of the response that would be received if in such a crisis the nation were to call upon the assistance of the riflemen. (Cheers.)

Millen was claiming here that even with the gradual build up of military reserves coming from the scheme of universal military training for youth – Junior and Senior Cadets – implemented from 1911, the rifle clubs were still a critically important source of reservists in the event of any external threat to the Nation.  Interestingly, if Millen’s comments are to be taken at face value, then less than a month before WW1 commenced, the concern at the highest level of the Defence Department was not with preparing for an Imperial war but, rather, as in the past, countering the threat of invasion.

Despite the accolades Senator Millen was prepared to shower on the rifle clubs, it was clear that by this point – mid 1914 – there were serious problems with the administration of the more than 1,000 rifle clubs and 47, 000  riflemen in Australia. The permanent Defence Force had always been skeptical of the value of rifle clubs and annoyed by the level of Commonwealth funding required to support them, but by mid 1914 there were more specific questions being raised. In the same month that it published Senator Millen’s praise of the rifle clubs, The Argus published several other articles highly critical of them. For example, on 14 July 1914 under the headline, Payments to Rifle Clubs. Irregularities Alleged. New Precautions there was  a report that questioned if men judged to be ‘efficient’ by the individual rifle club were, in fact, militarily capable in any meaningful sense of the word. The claim was that the level of marksmanship required for this rating was set far too low and that, additionally, the level of attendance required at training sessions was just as deficient. In other words, the rifle clubs were taking the Commonwealth capitation grants for men who could hardly shoot and attended hardly any training sessions. It then referred to one unnamed Victorian club where, following a formal investigation of its membership records, the officials had tendered their resignations and funds had had to be returned to the Defence Department. The basic concern appeared to be that current regulations were too lax and allowed the system to be rorted.  This meant that the real level of military preparedness amongst riflemen could be seriously lacking, and well short of what the Commonwealth was paying for. The size of the problem was potentially acute because the same article claimed that of the 45,000 riflemen in Australia in 1913, only 14,000 had attained the very minimal level of ‘efficient’. If such claims were true then on mobilisation the rifle clubs would have been a very deficient military force.

The Argus also reported in detail on the regulatory changes then being made to the rifle clubs. For example, the captain at each club was henceforth required to sign a statutory declaration when reporting his members’ musketry skills. As well, membership records had to be supplied by age, marital status and occupation. There was also a new requirement that members had to be signed off as medically fit for active service. Even details about horse ownership and riding skills had to be supplied. The intention was to improve overall efficiency and bring the rifle clubs into a closer and more seamless relationship with the permanent military forces. For the rifle clubs in Gippsland this was the 52 Infantry Regiment.

The following paragraph from The Argus – 4 July 1914 – appears to give the official Defence Force position on the reorganization of the rifle clubs:

Although the rifle club movement of Australia may be said to date from the war in South Africa, no concerted effort has yet been made to turn the enthusiasm of this civilian force to practical military account. During the last few weeks, however, the Commonwealth Mobilisation Committee … have had the matter under serious consideration, with the result that a scheme has been devised which will make the skilled marksmen of the Commonwealth immediately available in a national emergency. … There are altogether 47,565 riflemen in Australia, distributed over 1,133 clubs, and from now on this large body of men may be considered one of the most important factors in the military scheme. 

Exactly how events at the national level played out with the rifle clubs in the Shire of Alberton immediately before the War is hard to uncover. In theory, the clubs were thriving. Certainly there were regular reports in the local press about shooting competitions, with detailed results published. There appeared to be many members. Equally, the clubs filled a social function, much like other sporting clubs, and there were many reports of fund raisers and other social activities. At least two of the clubs – Yarram and Gelliondale – had even established separate ladies rifle clubs, with their own special competitions.

At the same time, there is other evidence to suggest that in terms of preparing men for armed service the clubs were well off the mark. For example, in the case of the Yarram Rifle Club, when war came in August 1914, the club itself did not take on the key role of organising volunteers. This was done by a small group of patriotic elders in the town. At this point it also emerged that the real numbers in the Yarram Rifle Club were low and that membership records had not been kept properly. The local paper reported on 7 August 1914 that the Secretary of the Yarram Rifle Club had actually contacted the Defence Department to ascertain how many members were in the club! It looks like there were only 26 financial members at the time.  Nor had the all-important drill sessions been provided for members. In fact, when the drill sessions did eventually come, at the very outbreak of the War, they were organised by the same group of patriotic elders who were pushing enlistments in the AIF. In short, as far as the Rifle Club at Yarram was concerned, the local riflemen were not about to mobilise immediately for war as citizen-soldiers. The proposed militia of citizens forces was not about to materialise. The theory could not be put into practice.

Possibly the local rifle clubs had been guilty of some of the charges cited at the national level in mid 1914. They might well have inclined more to the social rather than martial end of the continuum on war-readiness. However there are two qualifications, both of which will be pursued in future posts. The first is that the rifle clubs did seem to act as a pathway for recruitment in the AIF for the youth of the district. The second is that the particular rifle club at Stacey’s Bridge was held up as an example in the local district precisely because its members were well represented in the first group of recruits, in September 1914.  On that point, the trophy shown in this post was awarded to Patrick John Sexton (640), my wife’s great uncle, for marksmanship when he was a member of the Stacey’s Bridge Rifle Club. He was seventeen when he won the trophy in 1912. He enlisted at nineteen in September 1914. He was awarded the Military medal in 1917 and was killed in Belgium in April 1918.

References

Adams, J 1990, From these Beginnings: History of the Shire of Alberton (Victoria), Alberton Shire Council, Yarram, Victoria

An Act to provide for the Naval and Military Defence and Protection of the Commonwealth and of the several States. No. 20 of 1903. Commonwealth of Australia.

The Argus

‘Riflemen For War. Important Proposals. Allotment to Regiments’ 4 July 1914, p.19
‘Riflemen For War. Departmental Enquiries. Capitation Grant As Lever’ 6 July 1914, p.10
‘Value of Riflemen. Senator Millen’s Tribute’ 13 July 1914, p.6
‘Payments to Rifle Clubs. Irregularities Alleged. New Precautions’ 14 July 1914, p.8

Gippsland Standard and Alberton Shire Representative

‘Rifle Clubs. Call To Arms. Proposal To Muster 1000 Men’ 7 August 1914, p.2
‘Recruits for the War. Farewelled At The Alberton Railway Station’ 23 September 1914, p.2